“The Role of Deterrence in Disarmament”, Chapter 8 by Joseph Kashi,
in “The Dynamics of the Arms Race” , Edited by Carlton, et al, Halsted Press, 1974
Chapter 8 discusses how then-current theories of supposedly fail-safe “rational actor” nuclear deterrence proved unsound both theoretically and in real life. This paper, presented at a 1972 Conference at the University of Padua, suggests in summary form practical diplomatic and military lessons to be drawn from the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis, both of which had a significant probability of spiraling out of control into a possible nuclear war. It is a conceptual summary that evolved into my 1973 graduate school thesis at MIT.
Download: The Role of Deterrence in Disarmament.pdf
How current economic conditions may result in the growth of “virtual law firms”. (link broken, needs replaced)
Computer security and safeguarding privacy: http://abajournal.com/magazine/prying_eyes/